The Political Economy of Implementing the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme in India
In: Effective States and Inclusive Development Research Centre (ESID) Working Paper No. 15
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In: Effective States and Inclusive Development Research Centre (ESID) Working Paper No. 15
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Working paper
In: CSH Occasional paper, 20
World Affairs Online
In: Economica, Band 87, Heft 347, S. 763-812
ISSN: 1468-0335
This paper investigates the effects of an income guarantee on borrowing in a risky setting with marked seasonality. A three‐season, infinite‐horizon model is developed, in which the aims of smoothing consumption and maintaining creditworthiness are somewhat opposed and the seasonal timing of transfers matters. If borrowing does not affect production, then larger transfers concentrated in the lean season may well lead to a contraction of the total amount borrowed over the whole annual cycle. If borrowing also finances working capital, then larger transfers make riskier positions attractive, and investment in working capital and total borrowing may both increase. These insights are tested in the context of India's National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme, as implemented in upland Odisha. The potential endogeneity of participation is addressed by using the female reservation for local elections as an instrument. Each day's work reduces the estimated level of borrowing in the lean season by about the regulated wage. In contrast, the estimated effect on borrowing in the cultivation season by households owning at least the median holding is to increase it by about one‐and‐a‐half times the wage; but there is no significant effect for households owning less.
In: Economics of education review, Band 54, S. 124-142
ISSN: 0272-7757
In: European Journal of Political Economy, Band 41, S. 14-30
This paper examines how local politics affects public fund allocations. It uses the context of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) in India which was introduced by the Indian National Congress (INC). Using longitudinal data on funds sanctioned and election results from three rounds of elections in Rajasthan, a state in India, we find an inverted U-shaped relationship between existing vote share of INC and subsequent fund allocations at the block level. To address the issue of endogeneity, we instrument vote shares by their lagged values. The results using only close elections are however distinct as higher funds are allocated to blocks where the INC has lower vote share. We give evidence of a mechanism which highlights the role of a political representative in the funds sanctioning process. Further, we show that the strategy by INC was beneficial in gaining vote share.
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In: ESID Working Paper No. 42
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Working paper
In: Asian population studies, Band 8, Heft 2, S. 173-186
ISSN: 1744-1749
In: Poverty & public policy: a global journal of social security, income, aid, and welfare, Band 2, Heft 2, S. 189-209
ISSN: 1944-2858
AbstractThis paper seeks to understand temporal changes in poverty and well‐being in Indian cities during the era of economic reforms. The evidence on improvements in well being is mixed. During this period, there was an increase in the number of urban poor. Using two nationally representative samples, we compare the joint distribution of monthly per capita expenditure (a private good) and access to drainage (a public good) in slums and non‐slum areas of Indian cities to understand changes in well being. A comparison at two points in time, 1993 and 2002, suggests that the share of slum dwellers in urban poor has declined. However, we do not find evidence for improvement in the well‐being of slum dwellers over time. We do find that non‐slum urban dwellers are better off in 2002 compared to 1993.
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Working paper
In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 9357
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In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 8196
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Working paper
In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 6507
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We examine how overall delivery of public goods (i.e., efficiency) is affected by affirmative action in elections, i.e., restricting candidate entry in elections to one population group. We argue that when group identities are salient, such restrictions on candidate entry need not necessarily reduce electoral competition. In fact, when group sizes are asymmetric, affirmative action may increase electoral competition and consequently, improve provision of public goods. This happens because in an open election, the (best) candidate from the large group facing a minority candidate suffers from a moral hazard problem. Affirmative action eliminates this problem and increases within-group competition. We study a randomized caste based quota policy in village elections in a large state in India to test these claims. Consistently, we find that electoral quotas for a caste group (OBCs) increased provision of public goods in villages with high OBC population shares. We show that this did not happen due to changes in politicians' preferences or quality, and the increased provision of public goods did not disproportionately benefit the OBCs. Further, using election data, we show evidence in favor of our mechanism: win margins are narrower in quota elections relative to open elections in villages where OBC group is large. Our results highlight that efficiency concerns regarding affirmative action in politics may need reevaluation.
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In: ESID Working Paper No 35. Manchester: Effective States and Inclusive Development Research Centre, The University of Manchester
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Working paper